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Genocide and the Hispanic-American Dilemma
Eitan Ginzberg

University of Tel Aviv
Tel Aviv, Isreal
Si mi pluma tuviese don de lágrimas,
escribiría una obra titulada El indio,
y haría llorar al universo.
(If my pen had the gift of tears,
I would write a work called The Indian,
and make the universe cry).
Juan Montalvo, 18871
In a letter dated September 16, 1501, Queen Isabella I of Castile and King Ferdinand II of Aragón
instructed the governor of the Indies (at that time the Caribbean region), Nicolás de Ovando (15021509. Appointed to his post as early as Sep. 3, 1501), to treat the natives in a humane and decent
manner, enable them to move about freely, feel secure, and see to it that “no one is allowed to use
force against them, rob them, cause them another harm or damage.”2 The letter also commands
Ovando to be gentle and caring, while avoiding all use of coercion when converting the natives to
“our holy Catholic faith.”3
This royal demand of good will and fair treatment toward the Indians contained no statements
that could be construed as even hinting at a deliberate intention to harm the native population,
certainly as long as they “behaved,” that is, accepted the burden of Spanish rule and followed
its requirements, which were made clear in the Requirement Document.4 Nevertheless, Raphaël
Lemkin, like several Latin American historians and genocide scholars after him, was not impressed
by this. As far as he was concerned, the “demographic catastrophe” of sixteenth-century Spanish
America was a fact, though it was not mainly the result of epidemics, as was widely alleged by most
Latin American researchers, but rather deliberate killings, torture and massacres, mass bondage,
sexual abuse, deprivation of livelihoods, and extensive exploitation of the indigenous population,
carried out in blatant violation of directives, edicts, or official laws, which were hardly ever
enforced.5 While the local populace seemed to be showered with written professions of empathy
and sensitivity, they were made to carry heavy burdens and meet demands they could not possibly
cope with. As Lemkin pointed out, an atmosphere of abuse and terror dominated the colony.6 He
defined this as genocide, and he was the first to do so.
The present article is an attempt to investigate Lemkin’s claim within a framework which I
call the colonial paradox, that is, the intertwining of two contradictory policies, conservation and
exploitation. The essence of this paradox is that Spain actually intended to protect the Indians from
1

Antonio Sacoto, El indio en el Ensayo de la América Española (Quito: Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, 1994), 52.

2

Translation for the quote is as follow: “ninguno les haga fuerza, ni los roben, ni hagan otro mal ni daño.” (originally:
“ninguno les faga fuerza, nin los rroben, nin fagan otro mal nin dapño”). Quoted here is 16th century Spanish
adapted slightly to modern Spanish. See King Ferdinand II of Aragón and Queen Isabella I of Castile, “Instrucciones
al Comendador Frey Nicolas de Ovando. Gobernador de las Islas y Tierra Firme del Mar Oceano” [Instructions to
Commander Fray Nicolás de Ovando, Governor of the Islands and Mainland of the Ocean Sea] (Granada, 16 de
septiembre de 1501/Granada, September 16, 1501), in Colección de Documentos para la Historia de la Formación Social de
Hispanoamérica, 1493-1810. Volume I (1493-1592), ed. Richard Konetzke (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
Científicas, 1953), doc. 6, 5.

3

Ibid.

4

Refer to page 5 and page 7 of this article.

5

The provisions of the Spanish Crown to their agents in their American colonies are referred to by various names such
as Leyes, Cédulas, Cartas, Provisiones, Instrucciones, Cartas reales, Declaraciones, Ordenanças, Pragmáticas or various
combinations such as Leyes y Ordenanças or Carta y Provision real and so on. Despite the different terminology, which
express various legal formulations, 16th century jurists regarded them all as laws. See Alfonso Garcia Gallo, “La Ley
Como Fuente del Derecho en Indias en el Siglo XVI,” Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español 21-22 (1951-1952), 618-620.

6

Raphaël Lemkin, Spain Colonial Genocide. Raphaël Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 8, Folder 12 (American Jewish Historical
Society, Center for Jewish History: Boston, and New York).
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any harm they might suffer due to its presence in their territories, yet knowingly failed to do so,
albeit with a certain amount of anguish. The reason for this failure was, I believe, Spain’s knotty
national and colonial situation.
America dropped into Spain’s lap like manna from heaven. It had no “irresistible necessity”
for such a vast continent–at least not from a demographic perspective.7 Nevertheless, the discovery
of America opened up a military and commercial Pandora’s box–an entirely predictable outcome
for a society that had been involved in a centuries-long war–and brought Spain face to face with the
prospects of wealth, viewed essentially in terms of “gold and booty;”8 land, i.e., “lordship;”9 and
alien peoples, perceived as “vassals, slaves, and converts.”10 Since America could easily supply such
unexpected assets, as Cortés’s letters to King Charles related so convincingly,11 it was only natural
to bind them to the Spanish Crown through conquest, a sine qua non of all European countries’
“highly developed territorial consciousness” and competitiveness.12
Yet, by conquering America and occupying it para su mayor perpetuidad y firmeza (“in perpetuity”),
as stipulated in the special royal law of September 1519,13 Spain actually became trapped in it. At
a certain historical moment–let us say, in the middle of sixteenth century–when it was already
clear that the natives were being harmed and dying in masses as result of the demanding work
and harsh conditions imposed upon them, Spain was no longer in a position to abandon America
without severely damaging its status as a significant European power. Leaving America would
have meant handing it over to England and France, its main rivals in Europe. It would also have
entailed exposing the Indians, many of whom had already converted to Christianity, to further
abuse at the hands of greedy settlers, who would definitely remain in America, on the one hand,
and enraged pagan groups, who never recognized Spanish rule, on the other. Thus, having no
substitute for the native manpower needed to sustain its national and international status, and to
uphold its financial obligations to the pioneers and conquerors who had come to America at their
own expense,14 it appeared that Spain was unable to leave America.15 The only option left, after
7

John H. Elliott, “The Seizure of Overseas Territories by the European Powers,” in Theories of Empire, 1450-1800, ed. David
Armitage (Aldershot, Hampshire and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate, 1998), 139-140.

8

Ibid., 142.

9

Ibid.

10

Ibid.

11

Anthony Pagden, trans and ed., Hernán Cortés: Letters from Mexico (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1986), 40-46; ((first letter, April 1520); 92-96, 99-113 (second letter, April 1522)).

12

Elliott, The Seizure, 145-157.

13

King Charles I, “Que las Indias Occidentales estén Siempre Unidas á la Corona de Castilla, y no se pueden enagenar,”
[That the West Indies are always united to the Crown of Castile, and cannot be alienated], in Council of the Indies
(Real y Supremo Consejo de Indias), Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias, ed. Consejo de la Hispanidad.
(Madrid: Consejo de la Hispanidad, [1681] 1943), Tomo I, Libro III, Título I, Ley primera (Barcelona, Sept 14, 1519),
523.

14

This principle, already applied to Columbus during his (first) voyage to the Ocean’s Seas (Mares Oçéanas), became a
law in September 1573. See, King Philip II, “Que ningun Descubrimiento, ni Poblacion se haga á Costa del Rey” [That
no discovery, nor settlement is made at the expense of the King] (Segovia, 13 de julio de 1573/Segovia July 13, 1573),
Council of the Indies (Real y Supremo Consejo de Indias), in Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias, ed. Consejo
de la Hispanidad. (Madrid: Consejo de la Hispanidad, [1681] 1943), Tomo II, Libro IV, Título I, Ley XVII, 4.

15

The idea of relinquishing at least some parts of America was actually considered by Philip II in late 1556, a few months
after he ascended the throne. Sensitive to the criticism of the Crown’s conduct in America, he decided to weight
the matter at least with respect to the Viceroyalty of Peru. The Peruvian encomenderos (beneficiaries) represented
by Antonio de Rivera, a well-known encomendero (beneficiary) from Quito, offered to purchase their encomiendas
(grants) in perpetuity, along with all the associated jurisdiction rights, for 7.6 million ducats, and thus become the
exclusive rulers of the Viceroyalty (in reality, all of South America), while maintaining a certain affinity to the Crown.
The impoverished Philip was delighted with this proposal and formed a special committee made up of members
of the Colonial Council to examine its implications. The committee unequivocally rejected the offer, pointing out
that it would allow 300 or 400 encomenderos (beneficiaries) to take over all of South America, enslave the indigenous
people and wipe out every last one of them. See, Consejo de las Indias, “Parecer del Consejo de Las Indias de 21 de
octubre de 1556 en Repuesta de Ciertos Capítulos que Su Magestad les Enbio a Consultar Desde Gante Tocante a la
Perpetuidad de Las Indias,” in Juan de la Peña, Luciano Pereña, Escuela Española de la Paz, De Bello Contra Insulanos:
Intervención de España en América, II, Escuela Española de la Paz, segunda generación, 1560-1585, Posición de la Corona, ed.
Luciano Pereña et al, vol. 10 of Corpus Hispanorum de Pace (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas,
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rejecting the idea of turning Spain into a commercial or protectionist power in America, based
upon a contractual relationship with the Indians,16 was to continue its harmful, exploitative policy
toward the indigenous population.
This situation, which in effect eliminated the Crown’s freedom of action in American affairs
while creating an inherent contradiction between intentions and the ability to realize them, is what
I have called the colonial paradox. This paradox gave birth to a politics of duplicity, which exhibited a
firm, but basically hollow, protective approach to the Indians. Although its policies achieved some
minor improvements here and there, they were overshadowed by vigorous demands to increase
the wealth produced by the colonies, and strict instructions to make no use of the Crown’s treasury
to fund the colony’s maintenance and discoveries (i.e., further conquests). While the Crown
appeared to take notice of, and even invite criticism and debate, it also stifled them. Although
Church leaders or the King’s emissaries would always extol the natives’ humanity and natural
freedom, in reality, they were treated in a patronizing and superior manner, as if they were minors.
They were prohibited from wearing European clothing, riding on horses, possessing weapons,
serving in public or religious institutions, training for or holding certain qualified professions,
studying in Spanish schools and universities, or residing as individuals beyond the rural Indian
“republics” or specified urban neighborhoods. This approach was reinforced with appropriate
theological, legal, and moral justifications.
The present article will explore this paradox and point to the contradictions of Spain’s
colonization of America. These contradictions were exacerbated by Spain’s fragile economic
situation, as well as theological and ideological pressures, which prevented the implementation of
the Crown’s humanistic approach. From the standpoint of this perspective, I will attempt to clarify
the extent to which the concept of genocide–in the sense that Lemkin used in relation to Spanish
America–is the appropriate one to define the human disaster that took place in the lands under
Spain’s control.
To the best of my knowledge, this is a new and more comprehensive approach for examining
the Spanish American impact on the native population. My attempt goes beyond the conventional,
linear interpretive method of analyzing action and reaction–which was never able to resolve the
historiographic dispute surrounding Spanish American “black” or “white” legends–and suggests
a certain inclusive and more encompassing attitude toward the interpretive dilemma of Spanish
American colonialism.17
Good Intentions
In March 1503, Queen Isabella I and King Ferdinand II dispatched another communiqué, similar
to the previously cited letter of September 1501, instructing Governor Ovando to make sure that

1982), 94-97; Consejo de las Indias, “Recomendaciones del Consejo de Indias Sobre la Perpetuidad en el Peru,” in Juan
de la Peña, De Bello Contra Insulanos. Intervención de España en América, II, Escuela Española de la Paz, segunda generación,
1560-1585, Posición de la Corona, ed. Luciano Pereña et al., vol. 10 of Corpus Hispanorum de Pace (Madrid: Consejo
Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1982), 98-101. The Salamancan scholars and las Casas reacted similarly in
a lengthy document, De imperatoria seu [sive] regia potestate (The imperial or royal power). If the king accepts the
encomenderos’ (beneficiaries) offer, they contended, the Indians must be released from all their obligations to the
Spanish Crown and be given full rights of self-determination, immune from any possible plans of the Spanish settlers
to enslave or exploit them. In the end, after further consideration, the king gave up on the idea. See, Luciano Pereña,
“Estudio preliminar,” in Bartolomé de las Casas, De regia Postestate o Derecho de Autodeterminación, ed. Luciano Pereña
et al., vol. 8 of Corpus Hispanorum de Pace (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1969), xlvi-cxxxviii;
Bartolomé Hernández S.J., “Carta de Batolomé Hernández de la Compañía de Jesús y Confesor del Virrey, a Don
Juan de Ovando, Presidente del Consejo de Indias” [Letter of Batolomé Hernández], (Lima, 19 de abril de 1572/Lima,
April 19, 1572), in José de Acosta, “De procuranda Indorum Salute, o Pacificaión y Colonización,” ed. Luciano Pereña
et al, vol. 23 of Corpus Hispanorum de Pace (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1984), 642–653;
Bartolomé de las Casas, “De Imperatoria seu regia potestate,” in Bartolomé de las Casas, De regia Postestate o Derecho
de Autodeterminación, ed. Luciano Pereña et al., vol. 8 of Corpus Hispanorum de Pace (Madrid: Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Científicas, 1984), 1-115.
16

Please refer to the below discussion on page 16-17.

17

On the history of the “black legend,” see Miguel Molina Martínez, “La Lyenda Negra Revisitada: la Polémica
Continua,” Revista Hispanoamericana 2 (2012), 1-15.
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all Indians have a house where they can live with their families, work the land, and raise cattle.18
King Ferdinand II issued a cédula (royal command) in May 1509, which stipulated that the local
population should only be asked to take on light tasks, and that they should reside solely in their
own communities, and be governed by their own leaders.19
The Laws of Burgos (1512),20 which provided a legal basis for justifying both the Spanish
conquest of America and the exploitation of its indigenous population, endorsed the encomienda
(grant) as a benevolent civilizing institution,21 while attesting to the natives’ status as the legal
owners of the land, and asserting that their transfer to the encomiendas (grants) should be done
by means of persuasion alone.22 The arrangements for their work in the encomienda (grant) fields
and mines contained rigid guidelines that gave serious consideration to the appropriate type of
employment and nutrition for women, as well as young adults.23 The preamble of the Requerimiento
(Requirement Document) an important supplementary outcome of the Burgos Conference
expressed the following, on the whole quite principled ideas:
And we [the conquerors] in their name [the king of Spain and the Pope] shall receive you in
all love and charity, and shall leave you, your wives and your children, and your lands, free
without servitude, that you may do with them and with your own selves freely that which
you like and think best, and they shall not compel you to become Christians, unless you
yourselves, when informed of the truth, should wish to be converted to our Holy Catholic
Faith.24

In December 1526, an unequivocal royal decree demanded that native populations no longer
be sent to the gold mines in the Caribbean islands, since so many of them fell victim to the harsh

18

King Ferdinand II of Aragón and Queen Isabella I of Castille, “Introducción al Comendador Nicolás de Ovando,
Gobernador de la Islas y Tierra Firme, Sobre el Modo y Manera de Concentrar a la Población Indígena Dispersa en
Pueblos” [Introduction to Commander Nicolás de Ovando, Governor of the Islands and Mainland, on the manner
of concentrating the dispersed indigenous population in towns] (Alcalá de Henares, 20 de marzo y Zaragoza, 29 de
marzo, 1503/Alcalá de Henares, March 20, 1503 and Zaragoza, March 29, 1503), in Cedulario de Tierras: Compilación de
Legislación Agraria Colonial (1497-1820), ed. Francisco de Solano (México D. F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de
México, 1984), doc. 4, 110.

19

Ronald D. Hussey, “Text of the Laws of Burgos (1512-1513) Concerning the Treatment of the Indians,” Hispanic American
Historical Review 12, no. 3 (1932), 302.

20

The Laws of Burgos were an outcome of the Burgos Conference, a gathering of jurists, theologians, and representatives
of the Dominican Order, convened in the summer of 1512 (presumably in August) in Burgos, at the request of King
Ferdinand II and the Royal Council, in response the Dominican delegation’s outcry against the brutal exploitation
of the Indians which they had witnessed in Española in 1510-1511. The conference discussed a number of issues
concerning the status of the Spanish Crown in America, the civil status of the natives, their proper treatment, and
the process of their Christianization. The final document issued by the conference consisted of seven introductory
statements plus thirty-five laws. The Ordenanzas Para el Buen Tratamiento de los Indios (ordinances regarding the good
treatment of the Indians) were approved on December 27, 1512.

21

The encomienda (grant) was an allocation of land and a group of indigenous inhabitants to a Spanish settler for his use
and benefit. Typically, they were assigned to officers and soldiers who took part in expeditions of conquest and
pacification. Encomienda (grant) holders were not considered to be the owners of the lands assigned to them, rather
they held temporary rights of possession, which remained officially valid for three to four generations, but unofficially
as long as the family in question wished to retain it. Encomienda (grant) recipients were also required to Christianize
the indigenous inhabitants and provide for their spiritual well-being. Since early seventeenth century, the hacienda
(estate) gradually replaced the encomienda (grant).

22

Jorge Augusto Gamboa M., “La Encomienda y las Sociedades Indígenas del Nuevo Reino de Granada: el Caso de la
Provincia de Pampelona (1549-1650),” Revista de Indias 64, no. 232 (2004), 752.

23

Hussey, Text of the Laws of Burgos, 306-323; Bartolomé de las Casas, Historia de las Indias, vol. 3 (Caracas: Imprenta
Ayacucho, 1986), 53-71; King Philip II, “Real Cédula. A la Audiencia de Guatemala, Ordenando se haga Justicia
en Ciertas Usurpaciones de Tierras Baldíos y Edjidos en Términos de Santiago de Guatemala” [Royal Decree. To
the Audience of Guatemala, ordering justice to be done in certain usurpations of vacant [tierras baldíos] and public
community lands [ejidos] in the realm of Guatemala] (El Escorial, 10 de marzo, 1566/ El Escorial, March 10, 1566), in
Cedulario de Tierras: Compilación de Legislación Agraria Colonial (1497-1820), doc 79, ed. Francisco de Solano (México D.
F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1984), 204-205.

24

Lewis Hanke, “The ‘Requerimiento’ and Its Interpreters,” Revista de Historia de América 1, no. 1 (1938), 26-28.
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working conditions. “Almost no natives remain on these islands today,” declared the king.25 This
was a logical continuation of a decree issued one month before, which outlawed slavery in Spanish
America, and ordered the full and complete liberation of all enslaved Indians, including those who
vehemently rejected Spain’s domination and rebelled against it.26 On June 9, 1537, Pope Paul III
issued a papal bull, Sublimis Deus (the sublime God), which affirmed the native population’s status
as full-fledged, free individuals.27 In order to remove any doubt regarding his steadfast stance on
the rights of the indigenous peoples, the Pope issued another papal bull entitled Veritas ipsa (the
truth itself) in same month, which sharply criticized their enslavement and openly supported the
king’s aggressive campaign against it.28
In January 1539, Francisco de Vitoria, head of the cathedra of theology at the University of
Salamanca and an influential advisor to King Charles delivered a lecture entitled De indis recenter
inventis (On the Indians lately discovered), in which he resolutely refuted all the condemnations
against the Indians, who were generally believed to be amentes vel insensati (insane or foolhardy).
He declared that they were totally rational and normal people, and could, therefore, be full-fledged
owners of their properties (i.e., absolutely sovereign), which they were fully capable of managing.29
According to Charles’s New Laws of 1542, all the encomiendas (grants), which the monarch had
accused of harming the Indians, were to be dismantled and their lands and properties returned
to the state, immediately upon the death of their original owner.30 The Ovandino Codex of King
Philip II, a partial collection of laws relating to the colony and adopted before 1573, focused on
different aspects of the religious, administrative, and judicial life in America.31 The Requirement
Document was abrogated; the word “conquest” in official papers was changed to “discovery;” and
the indigenous population’s absolute freedom of movement, self-government, and freedom from
bondage was declared and reconfirmed.32
From 1503, a major relocation (officially described as reducción or congregación) of the local
population was considered. The idea was to create autonomous Indian communities, officially
known as repúblicas de indios (Indian republics), where it would be easier to control, convert, and
organize them economically, while protecting them from Spanish abuse. The entire shift to new
communities, which was intensively implemented over the following 150 years, was based upon
persuasion and goodwill, generous allocations of land, with protection from any type of subjugation
or land expropriation, as well as development grants, preferential treatment for caciques (leaders),
25

King Charles I, “Real Cédula. Para que los Indios no se echen en las Minas” [Royal Decree: That the Indians are
not compelled to work in mines] (Granada, 8 de diciembre de 1525/Granada, December 8, 1525), in Colección de
Documentos para la Historia de la Formación Social de Hispanoamérica, I, ed. Richard Konetzke (Madrid: Consejo Superior
de Investigaciones Científicas, 1953-1958), doc. 48, 97-98.

26

King Charles I, “Que los Indios sean Libres, y no Sujetos á Servidumbre” [That the Indians be free, and not subject to
servitude] (Granada, 9 de noviembre de 1526/Granada, November 9, 1526), in Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las
Indias, ed. Council of the Indies (Real y Supremo Consejo de Indias), (Madrid: Consejo de la Hispanidad, 1943 [1681]),
Tomo II, Libro VI, Título II, Ley I, 201. This law was restated in 1530, 1532, 1540, 1542, and 1548.

27

Lewis Hanke, “Pope Paul III and the American Indians,” The Harvard Theological Review 30, no. 2 (1937), 73-74, 83-85;
Jesús María Añoveros, “Carlos V y la Abolición de la esclavitud de los Indios,” Revista de Indias 60, no. 218 (2000), 8081.

28

Hanke, Pope Paul III, 74; Añoveros, Carlos V y la Abolición, 81-83.

29

Francisco de Victoria, De Indis et de Iure Belli Relectiones, ed. Ernest Nys (Buffalo, NY: William S. Heim and Co., 1995),
120-128 [fols. 315-336].

30

Añoveros, Carlos V y la Abolición, 70-81.

31

King Phillip II and the Colonial Council initiated the classification of the vast number of laws, orders, guidelines, and
directives (or, in more general terms, “royal dispositions”) pertaining to the colony into neat files, a task that was only
completed in 1681.

32

El Ministerio de la Vivienda/Spanish Ministry of Housing, Transcripción de las Ordenanzas de Descubrimiento, Nnueva
Población y Pacificación de las Indias dadas por Felipe II, el 13 de julio de 1573, en el Bosque de Segovia, según el original que se
conserva en el Archivo General de Indias de Sevilla [Transcription of the Ordinances of discovery, erecting new (Indian)
towns and pacification of the Indies given, by King Philip II on July 13, 1573 in the Forest of Segovia, according to the
original that is preserved in the General Archive of the Indies of Seville] (Madrid: El Ministerio de la Vivienda, 1973),
articles 29, 30; Silvio Zavala, New Viewpoints on the Spanish Colonization of America (New York: Russel and Russel, 1968),
42; Angel Martín González, Gobernación Espiritual de Indias: Código Ovandino, Book I (Guatemala: Instituto Teológico
Salesiano, 1977), 18.

©2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 2 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.2.1666

Genocide and the Hispanic-American Dilemma

127

long-term exemptions from taxes and levies, and organized agreements for the registration of
private land ownership.33
The Reality
It turned out, however, that the reality was much more complex than what these examples portray.
First, it is important to note that by 1681 a vast number of orders and directives–more than 400,000–
as well as 6,447 laws had been drawn up with the aim of organizing life in the colony,34 thousands
of them in reaction to injurious behavior toward the native population perpetrated by the Crown’s
agents.35 Yet, these directives, which contained instructions about the proper treatment of the
natives, often contained internal contradictions. The same document might put forth certain
demands or assertions, and in the next breath, conflicting demands, making it impossible to
implement a strategy of defending the Indians, while exacerbating an already difficult status quo.
Furthermore, almost all the laws or directives that addressed crucial issues such as slavery,
personal services (provided to encomenderos (beneficiaries) in lieu of tribute (poll tax) levies, but
tantamount to slavery), hazardous work, the disruption of daily life, etc., contained “loopholes for
abuse,”36 as the famous Spanish oidor (judge), Alonso de Zorita, called them in late 16th century,
or “permitted loopholes,” as Matthew Restall has call them today.37 Such loopholes undermined
the implementation of these laws, creating a distorted legal status, which the Swedish hispanista
(specialist in Spanish history and culture), Magnus Mörner, termed “non-compliance of the law as
a legal institution.”38 Indeed, as early as 1647, the famous jurist Juan de Solórzano y Pereyra noted
that this situation allowed considerable room for the “adaptation” of royal decrees and laws “segun
lo piden los casos” (“with respect to the demands of the moment”). Such adaptations related not
to the urgent needs of the Indians, but to those of the Spanish kings, settlers, and others.39 The
following examples illustrate this paradox in a number of areas.
The abovementioned letters dispatched to Governor Nicolás de Ovando were not sent without
cause. Just as Queen Isabella 1 and King Ferdinand II demanded he treat the indigenous population
with respect and consideration, so, too, was he required to supply native workers for the mines,
fields, and construction sites in the cities. Recruiting these workers made it possible for Ovando to
supply the king and queen with the means to maintain the colony, i.e., by allocating a respectable
quinta (fifth) of its revenues to the royal treasury. In order to achieve this goal, they allowed Ovando
to uproot the Indian population from the islas inútiles (“useless islands”), where no gold was found,
with most of them being sent first to Española40 (or the isla de oro (isle of gold)), and after 1511,
to Cuba as well, following its conquest. Yet, because some groups of Indians refused to work, or
to work for Spain, and at times vehemently resisted or fled this forced transfer, the “relocation”
crusade turned into a ruthless manhunt in which the captured natives were defined as Prisoners
of War (POWs)–since this was seen as a “just war”–and enslaved. Utter chaos ensued along with
a rapid decrease in the indigenous population, which Ovando could not control.41 Ferdinand’s
way of dealing with the situation was to send the abovementioned royal warrant to Don Diego

33
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leyes de los Reynos de las Indias, ed. Consejo de la Hispanidad (Madrid: Consejo de la Hispanidad, [1681] 1943), Tomo II,
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Colón, Governor of the Indies (1509-1518), in May 1509.42 Yet, in November, as if ignoring his
earlier, benevolent cédula (royal command), he demanded that his treasurer in Española, Miguel
de Pasamonte, do everything in his power to increase productivity.43 The withholding of half of the
Castilian income following the death of Queen Isabella I in 1504,44 while his responsibilities as the
ruling monarch of Spain remained the same, left him no choice.
The Crown initiated the abovementioned Burgos Conference in response to the storm that
swept Española in the wake of two sermons delivered by Antonio de Montesinos, the Dominican
representative, in November and December 1511, and the harsh criticism of the treatment
endured by the indigenous population which they contained.45 The Burgos Laws, the outcome
of the conference convened in the Castilian capital, demanded more humane treatment of the
native population–men, women, and children–but they lacked authority and failed to impress
the colonists, who were struggling with a dwindling native workforce and a demanding quinta
(fifth). Furthermore, the second part of the Requerimiento (Requirement Document) drawn up at
the conference empowered the officials in America to wage war against the Indians who refused to
acquiesce to their demands:
[We] shall forcibly enter your country and make war against you in all ways and manners that
we can, and subject you to the yoke and obedience of the Church and of their Highness[es],
we shall take you and your wives and your children, and shall make slaves of them, and as
such shall sell and dispose [of] them as their Highnesses may command; and we shall take
away your goods, and shall do all the harm and damage that we can.46

Charles I, who ascended the throne in March 1516, was no less concerned than his predecessor
(and grandfather) about the decline of the Crown’s income due to the rapid waning of the native
Caribbean population, which continued to decline due to the smallpox epidemic that spread
through the region in 1518. Unable to find a creative alternative for the desperately needed
manpower of his Circum-Caribbean colony, which was intended to produce a sizeable surplus for
his imperial treasury, Charles extended Ferdinand’s manhunt policy in the Lesser Antilles to the
1,000 km coastline of the Tierra Firme del Mar Océano, the northern region of present day Venezuela,
an area his grandfather, apparently under the influence of the Burgos Conference, had tried to
preserve for the missionary activity of the Dominicans and Franciscans from Santo Domingo.47 In
order to justify his decision to make the Caribes (the name given to the region’s Indian population
in 1493) fair game for capture and enslavement, Charles, relying on evidence provided by none
other than the slave hunters, branded the Caribes as rebellious cannibals.48
As time went on and the demographic catastrophe in the Caribbean became evident, the
king was forced to ban any type of indigenous labor in that area, outlaw slavery there and in all
of Spanish America, and cancel any previously granted slave hunting permit. Obviously, King
Charles’s response of 1526 came too late. Worse still, it didn’t spare the Caribes (and by extension any
belligerent Indians). Charles’s acceptance of their negative image made the slave hunters feel that
42
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they could ignore the king’s orders, certainly with respect to the Caribes.49 This situation apparently
empowered King Philip’s decision in January 1569 to exclude the Caribes from the sweeping,
overall ban on bondage in America. It is puzzling, however, that knowingly or unknowingly,
King Philip extended this exemption for all time. Indeed, it was integrated into the compilation
of Recopilación de leyes de los Reynos de las Indias (Spanish colonial laws) of 1681, as though time
had frozen somewhere in November 1526 or January 1569.50 This loophole decision unleashed an
enterprise that hunted down and enslaved 235,000 to 410,000 human beings in Circum Caribbean
alone, up to year 1800, most of them Caribes, and an additional 1,770,000-3,600,000 Indians in other
Spanish-American enclaves.51 According to the mortality rate in the Circum Caribbean during the
early sixteenth century, it is apparently safe to assume that few of these people survived. Needless
to say, King Charles’s actions in 1520 against the Caribes critically damaged the work of the
missionaries operating in northern Colombia and Venezuela. But, as we have, and will continue to
see, when the Crown’s revenues conflicted with the Church’s interests, the latter were ignored.52
Another example is Pope Paul III’s abovementioned bull, which was written in response to
the distress of the Church leaders in Mexico, who were appalled by the impact of Domingo de
Betanzos’s condemnation against the Indians, i.e., that they lacked interest in Christianity and were
too primitive to grasp the complexity of the Christian faith.53 Yet precisely one year after sending
his seal, the Pope was forced to annul the penalty clause, including the section pertaining to the
punishment that would befall anyone who dared inflict harm on the indigenous population.54 The
king regarded the papal document as a violation of his authority, and demanded the termination
of the Holy See’s display of independence.55 As Lewis Hanke asserted, “Paul III took away with one
hand what he gave with the other.” 56
In a similar vein, it is important to note the sharp about-face taken by Francisco de Vitoria
in his lecture De Indis (On the Indians) of January 1539. Even though the first part of his lecture
praised the local populations for their political, judiciary, and cultural initiative during the period
preceding the arrival of the Spanish, the third and last part argues that it would be impossible
to place control in the hands of the Indians following the Spanish conquest because they are still
“people of defective intelligence; and indeed they are no whit or little better than such, as far as
self-government is concerned, or than wild beasts, for their food is not more pleasant and hardly
any better than that of beasts.”57 Vitoria understood this as being indicative of a flawed body and
soul, which meant that “some are by nature slaves, for all the barbarians in question are of that type
and so they may in part be governed as slaves are.”58
The new, decidedly protective laws drawn up in November 1542,59 would never have been
promulgated had it not been for the harsh criticism of Bartolomé de las Casas, who described the
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Aristotle and the American Indians: A Study in Race Prejudice in the Modern World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1970), 23-24.

54

Hanke, Pope Paul III, 86-90 Ferdinand II resorted to a similar stratagem in 1505. See, Hanke, Pope Paul III, 76.

55

J. Lloyd Mecham, “The Church in Colonial Spanish America,” in Colonial Hispanic America, ed. A. Curtis Wilgus (New
York: Russell & Russell, 1963), 200-214.

56

Hanke, Pope Paul III, 91.

57

de Victoria, De Indis, 160-161 [fols. 406-407].

58

de Victoria, De Indis, 161 [fol. 408].

59

King Charles I, “Nuevas Leyes y Ordenanzas para la Gobernación de las Indias y Buen Tratamiento y Consevación
de los Indios,” in Juan de la Peña, De bello Contra Insulanos. Intervencíon de España en América II, Escuela Española de la

©2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 2 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.2.1666

Ginzberg

130

catastrophic situation in America to the king, after his return to Spain at the beginning of 1540.60 Las
Casas prepared two position papers, which he submitted to the Royal Councils–now known as the
Council of Castile and the Council of the Indies–one regarding the reasons for the numerical decline
of the indigenous populations, and the other entitled “Twenty Arguments against the Encomiendas
(beneficiaries).” Both papers called for the disbanding of the encomienda (grant) system, which las
Casas held responsible for most of the problems, and its replacement with a plan of colonization
that was humanistic in nature.61 To Las Casas’s mortification, the laws were never implemented.
An open rebellion of the colonists instigated and led by Gonzalo Pizarro, Francisco Pizarro’s halfbrother, in Peru, was nipped in the bud, and ended with the murder of Viceroy Blasco Núñez Vela,
who had insisted on implementing the new laws. In New Spain, Viceroy Antonio de Mendoza
prevented their publication, fearing that a similar rebellion would break out there, too. The fierce
reactions to the new laws forced the king to moderate them, so that their main purpose, the
annulment of the encomienda (grant) system, was avoided.62
In the famous debate held in Valladolid, the king, ever wavering on colonial issues, summoned
las Casas, protector of the Indians, and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, a historian and priest known for
his Aristotelian and rigid approach to the indigenous peoples, to address the matter of their status
and treatment. No decision was reached, however. In fact, the king did not allow the fourteen
venerable judges, who had heard the various testimonies during the two rounds of hearings–the
first in August-September 1550 and the second in April-May 1551–to hand down their rulings.63
The 1575 laws promulgated by Philip II also stemmed from the continuing demographic decline
in the colonies. In 1568, the king received a memorandum entitled Memorial sobre la despoblación y
destrucción de Indias (Memorial on the depopulation and destruction of the Indies). Written by Father
Louis Sánchez and sent to the king by his chief inquisitor, Bishop Diego Espinoza, it contained
disturbing news about the oppressive treatment of the native population by the Spaniards.
Father Sánchez claimed that they were behaving like “greedy people who always wanted more,
whose only goal was to become rich at the expense of Indian sweat and blood.”64 Angered by this
report, the king blamed the situation on the Council of the Indies and demanded an immediate
investigation into the situation in the colonies. In addition, he ordered the convening of a Junta
Magna (special assembly) of the Council in 1568, which was charged with providing a precise
definition of the rights of the Indians. The investigation, conducted by the prominent priest and
jurist, Juan Ovando y Godoy–who was also a member of the Royal Council at that time–lasted
more than a year and did, in fact, prove that the Council was virtually blind to the grim realities
in the colony.65 The result of this process, the Codex Ovandino, ensured the Indians’ freedom, but it
did not abolish the mandatory Christianizing, poll tax, and forced labor, which continued to grow,
by order of King Philip himself.66 The king also authorized the use of force against Indians who
objected to Christianization or to the building of Spanish colonies in the areas where they resided.67
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The Third Provisional Convention of the Mexican Church (including Guatemala, Honduras,
and the Philippines), which took place in Mexico in 1585, exposed the very harsh reality of the
indigenous communities.68 Although originally convened to deal with apostolic matters, the
convention–following the demands of the religious orders’ representatives, and some of the
lawyers and theologians who had been summoned as advisors–addressed two burning issues
affecting daily life in New Spain: repartimiento (forced labor) and the cruel war against the
indigenous population of north and north-west Mexico, referred to by the generic Nahuatl name
chichimecas (Chichimecans).69 The Franciscan delegation to the convention faithfully described the
critical overall situation, which included the mass deaths of forced mine laborers, the assigning of
forced laborers to forbidden work (forestry, portage, and construction), the many over- or underage laborers, the overworking of laborers, serious abuse by unchallengeable Spanish settlers and
caste members of defenseless Indian women left at home while their husbands were on labor
assignments, underfeeding and starvation in workplaces, physical and emotional abuse, slave
wages, and, finally, the near-total depletion of the Indian population due to mass deaths and
desertions. The Franciscans compared the Indians to sheep, who had died because their shepherds
had entrusted them to wolves,70 and concluded that continued compulsory work would bring
about the total demise of the colony, and the everlasting disgrace of Spain’s future generations.71
A similar view was presented in relation to the Chichimecan War. Delegates of the four religious
orders maintained that the Spanish themselves expected to benefit financially by capturing the
Chichimecans and either putting them to work in the mines of Zacatecas, or selling them into
slavery (in slave markets located as far away as Guatemala).72 Their actions had frightened the
local population into responding violently to Spanish infiltration into their natural habitat. The
Spaniards, in turn, reacted by declaring all-out war (justified, in their eyes) against the Indians,
resulting in the ultimate death of a staggering number of them.73
The reality of the Indian relocation (or rather, displacement) process also reveals the disparity
between declared intent and reality, and the inherent discrepancies of the edicts. On the one hand,
persuasiveness and goodwill were endorsed, while on the other, the use of force was permitted
if the Indians refused to relocate. Furthermore, it was decided that following relocation, the
abandoned settlements would be burnt so the Indians could not return to them or use them as
68
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shrines.74 Additionally, it was a common practice to relocate Indians far away from their traditional
lands, where there were no plots for their personal use, as required by the transfer laws.75 Later
on, in stark contrast to the strict protective separation of the Indian republics from any nearby
Spanish settlement, there were endless reports of livestock entering fields belonging to Indians and
consuming their crops,76 illegal trespassing by Spanish and caste members through native territory,
the molestation and even the kidnapping of native women and children,77 coercion and enticement
to sell privately owned or even community owned possessions (the sale of which was prohibited)
to the Spanish for the price of a shirt and a bottle of wine, ruthless demands for unpaid work for the
confradías (religious brotherhood), and hospitals run by the priesthood inside the Indian republics.
Overall, the Indians were exposed to a form of oppression that brought about premature
death, despair, and the forsaking of farming, to the point where entire settlements were deserted,
a situation which Meléndez Váldes’s 1791 report called Sensible Decadencia (Notable Decline).78
Decadencia (decline) was the result of systematically applied methods of pressure, abuse, and
harassment imposed on the indigenous population for generations.79 At the same time, a ceaseless
stream of royal cédulas (royal commands) and laws emphatically demanded an end to these
horrendously lethal practices. For the most part, however, official instructions and laws were
ignored or adjusted, as Solórzano and Mörner pointed out.80

74

Francisco de Solano, ed., Cedulario de Tierras, Compilación de Legislación Agraria Colonial (1497-1820) (México D.F.:
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1984). 83.

75

King Philip II, “Que á los Indios Reducidos no se quiten las Tierras que ántes hubieren Tenido” [That the lands
previously owed by the Indians will not be taken from them while being resettled], [Toledo, 19 de Febrero de 1560/
Toledo, February 19, 1560]), in Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias, Tomo II, LibroVI, Título III, Ley IX, ed.
Consejo de la Hispanidad (Madrid: Consejo de la Hispanidad, [1681] 1943), 209.

76

King Philip II, “Real Cédula. Por la que se ordena que entre Haciendas y Pueblos de Indios Exista por lo Menos una
Distancia de Media Legua” [Royal Decree. By which it is ordered that between (Spanish) haciendas and Indian towns
there should be a distance of at least half a league] (Tomar, 1 de mayo de 1581/Tomar, May 1, 1581), in Cedulario
de tierras Compilación de Legislación Agraria Colonial (1497-1820), ed. Francisco de Solano (México D. F.: Universidad
Nacional Autónoma de México, 1984), doc. 117, 258; King Philip II, “Real Cédula. Al virrey y audiencia de México
ampliando a 600 varas a la redonda los términos del pueblo de indios y a 1,100 varas los límites de fujación de las
estancias...” [Royal Decree. To the Viceroy and Audience of Mexico, extending to 500 meters around the limits of the
Indian towns and to 920 meters around the limits of the cattle ranches ... ] (Madrid, Junio 4 de 1687/Madrid, June 4,
1687), in Cedulario de tierras Compilación de Legislación Agraria Colonial (1497-1820), ed. Francisco de Solano (México D.
F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1984), doc. 181, 365-366.

77

King Charles I, “Real Cédula. Para que las Estancias de Ganados se sitúen Lejos de los Pueblos y Sementeras de los
Indios” [Royal Decree. That the cattle ranches are located away from the Indian towns and their cultivated plots]
(Valladolid, 24 de marzo, 1550/Valladolid, March 24, 1550), in Cedulario de Tierras Compilación de Legislación Agraria
Colonial (1497-1820), ed. Francisco de Solano (México D. F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1984), doc. 51,
173; King Philip II, “Real Cédula. Por la que se ordena que Entre Haciendas y Pueblos de Indios Exista por lo Menos
una Distancia de Media Legua” [Royal Decree. By which it is ordered that between (Spanish) haciendas and Indian
towns there should be a distance of at least half a league] (Tomar, 1 de mayo de 1581/Tomar May 1, 1581), in Cedulario
de Tierras Compilación de Legislación Agraria Colonial (1497-1820), ed. Francisco de Solano (México D. F.: Universidad
Nacional Autónoma de México, 1984), doc. 117, 258.

78

King Charles I, “Real Cédula. Para que las Estancias de Ganados se sitúen Lejos de los Pueblos y Sementeras de los
Indios” [Royal Decree. That the cattle ranches are located away from the Indian towns and their cultivated plots]
(Valladolid, 24 de marzo, 1550/Valladolid, March 24, 1550), in Cedulario de Tierras Compilación de Legislación Agraria
Colonial (1497-1820), ed. Francisco de Solano (México D. F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1984), doc.
51, 173; King Philip II, “Real Cédula. Por la que se ordena que Entre Haciendas y Pueblos de Indios Exista por lo
Menos una Distancia de Media Legua” [Royal Decree. By which it is ordered that between (Spanish) haciendas and
Indian towns there should be a distance of at least half a league] (Tomar, 1 de mayo de 1581/Tomar, May 1, 1581),
in Cedulario de Tierras Compilación de Legislación Agraria Colonial (1497-1820), ed. Francisco de Solano. (México D. F.:
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1984), doc. 117, 258.

79

King Philip V, “Real Cédula. Ordenando que se cumplan las Disposiciones Dictadas sobre los Bienes y Disponibilidades
de los Pueblos de Indios” [Royal Decree. Ordering that the provisions issued on the Indian assets and availability
of lands compiled with the Indian peoples] (Madrid. 15 de octubre, 1713/Madrid, October 15, 1713), in Cedulario de
Tierras Compilación de Legislación Agraria Colonial (1497-1820), ed. Francisco de Solano (México D. F.: Universidad
Nacional Autónoma de México, 1984), doc. 196, 405-406.

80

See Mörner, La Corona Española; de Solórzano y Pereyra, Política Indiana.

©2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 2 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.2.1666

Genocide and the Hispanic-American Dilemma

133

The Epidemiological Question
One key question remains open in regard to the colonial paradox: were epidemics responsible
for the liquidation of the majority of the population as claimed first by Jehan Vellard, in an article
published in 1956 and Woodrow Borah in 1962, and later by other scholars such as Alfred Crosby,
William H. McNeill, Suzanne Austin Alchon, Nicolás Sánchez Albornoz, and Noble David Cook?81
A parallel revisionist interpretation, started as early as the 1960s by Juan Friede, Stafford Poole, and
John Hemming, and spearheaded since then by Benjamin Keen, Tzvetan Todorov, Carlos Sempat
Assadourian, Massimo Livi Bacci, David Stannard, Tzvi Medin, Andrés Reséndez, Matthew
Restall, and others rejects this claim. In their view, the extremely harsh living conditions, ethnic
dehumanization, cultural annihilation, the state of living under constant threats, endless moves
from one ecological region to another, and hunger and despair were the main causes for the demise
of the native population.82
There is probably no way to resolve this controversy, since we do not have any reliable Spanish
or Indian analyses about the cause of death among the native population during the period in
question.83 Some evidence do exist, I believe, which indicates that the exceptionally high death
toll has more to do with Spanish policies and behavior than epidemiological or biological reasons.
The first is the challenge posed by the Caribbean case, where smallpox broke out in 1518, after
most of the Indian inhabitants of this extensive region were already dead.84 Another challenge is
posed by the epidemiologists themselves, who have been forced to acknowledge the Spaniards’
brutality and the harmful impact of their interference in the ecological balance and the natives’ way
of life. For example, Suzanne Austin Alchon pointed out, in reference to the demographic disaster
of sixteenth-century Ecuador, that in Spanish America, “illness was not only physiological, it was
also political.”85 In other words, “the introduction of Old-World infections does not fully explain
the dramatic decline of native populations. Rather, the combination of epidemic diseases and the
simultaneous loss of control over social and economic resources led to the death of millions.”86
81

Jehan Vellard, “Causas Biológicas de la Desaparición de los Indios Americanos,” Boletín del Instituto Riva Agüero 2 (1956),
77-93; Woodrow Borah, “América como Modelo?: El Impacto Demográfico de la Expansión Europea Sobre el Mundo
no Europeo,” Cuadernos Americanos 21, no. 6 (1962), 176-185; Alfred W. Crosby, The Columbia Exchange: Biological and
Cultural Consequence of 1492 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1973), 31; Alfred W. Crosby, “Conquistador y Pestilencia:
The First New World Pandemic and the Fall of the Great Indian Empires,” The Hispanic American Historical Review
47, no. 3 (1967), 321-337; William H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (New York: Anchor Press, 1976), 102-105, 206, 227228; Suzanne Austin Alchon, Native Society and Disease in Colonial Ecuador (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991); Nicolás Sánchez Albornoz, “The Population of Colonial Spanish America,” in The Cambridge History of Spanish
America, II: Colonial Spanish America, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 8-11; Noble
David Cook, Born To Die: Disease and New World Conquest, 1492-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
Elsa Malvidi, “La Epidemiología, una Propuesta para Explicar la Despoblación Americana,” Revista de Indias 63, no.
227 (2003), 21-65.

82

John Hemming, The Conquest of the Inca (London: Abacus, 1972), 349-365; Benjamin Keen, “The White Legend Revisited:
A Reply to Professor Hanke’s ‘Modest Proposal’,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 51, no. 2 (1971), 336-355;
Stannard, American Holocaust; Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other (New York: Harper
and Row, 1982), 5, 145; Juan Friede, “Demographic Changes in the Mining Community of Muzo after the Plague of
1629,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 47, no. 3 (1967), 338-343; Assadourian, La Despoblación Indígena, 419-453;
Massimo Livi Bacci, Conquest: The Destruction of the American Indios, trans. Carl Ipse (Cambridge and Malden: Polity
Press, [2005] 2008); Tzvi Medin, Mito, Pragmatismo e Imperialismo. La Conciencia Social en la Conquista del Imperio Azteca
(Madrid: Iberoamerica-Vernuert, 2009), 21-67; Reséndez, The Other Slavery, 17; Restall, When Montezuma Met Cortés,
328-330.

83

At the 2008 conference of historians at Juárez University (Chihuahua) in Mexico, which focused on the historical
impact of smallpox on the population of New Spain from the beginning of the colonial period until the twentieth
century, conference participants admitted that it was impossible to conduct an “archeology of mortality” that could
be applied to the sixteenth century. See, David Robichaux, “El Papel de la Viruela en la Historia Demográfica de
México: Reflexiones a partir de Cuatro Siglos de ‘Viruelas’ en dos Parroquias de Tlaxcala,” in El Impacto Demográfico
de la Viruela en México de la época Colonial al siglo XX: Estudios de Larga Duración, vol. 3, eds. Chantal Cramaussel et al.
(Zamora: El Colegio de Michoacán, 2010), 23, 32, 37-39.

84

The attempt by Noble David Cook, a great advocate of the epidemic approach, to show that deadly epidemics broke out
in the Caribbean even before 1518, seems to me far-fetched, since it does not include any convincing quantitative or
comparative analysis. See, Cook, Born to Die, 37-59.

85

Alchon, Native Society and Disease, 133.

86

Ibid.

©2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 2 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.2.1666

Ginzberg

134

This was clear enough not only to the more prominent sixteenth-century critics such as las Casas,
Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, or Alonso de Zorita,87 but also to less well-known observers such as
the delegates to the Third Provincial Council of the Mexican Church, who warned the king about
the imminent danger of Indian extinction, which would lay waste to the colonial territories and put
an end to the Crown’s hopes for great wealth and prestige.
What seems even more convincing, however, is the fact that none of the 6,447 laws included
in the 1681 compilation–more than sixty percent of which were enacted in the sixteenth century–
made any mention of pestilencias, pestes (epidemics), or contained any guidelines about dealing
with outbreaks of such contagious diseases. If the laws contained no references to epidemics, it is
not unreasonable to expect that at least some of the thousands of the most prominent cédulas reales
(royal decrees) would deal with diseases, but my analysis of more than 1,000 such commands
from the years 1500-1650 reveals that almost none of them did so. The word enfermedades (diseases)
rarely appears, and when it does it is not in the sense of epidemics, but as part of a general demand
addressed to the colonial authorities or the Spanish encomenderos (beneficiaries) to “treat the natives
well, bring them into the bosom of Christianity, and provide them with food, clothing, and a cure
for their diseases.”88
The kings and their councils were aware of the spread of epidemics, since this information
was regularly reported by colonial officials, visitors, and clergy.89 Yet, contrary to their active
involvement in coping with the plagues that erupted in Spain during the same period,90 they
showed no similar apprehension about this matter in America.91 What worried the monarchs more
than the diseases was the vicious behavior of the Spanish settlers, castes, and officials towards
the Indians. The complaints lodged by Spain’s monarchs were not isolated comments, but rather
a long-standing criticism of Spanish behavior, which cited enslavement, extortion, intimidation,
human trafficking, invasion, displacement, the disruption of normal life, exhaustion, as well as rape,
threats, violence, and death. The following cédula (royal command) of February 1577, addressed to
the audiencia (high court) of Quito is but one example, “[b]ecause of the excessive work and abuse
that they [the Spaniards] have done and still do [to the Indians], many [of them] have died.” The
cédulas (royal command) stated time and again that they (the Indians) “were running out (se han
acabando) as the result of the Spaniards.”92
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Over the centuries, the Crown repeatedly attributed the decimation of the native population to
their agents’ disregard for royal demands of sensitive and protective behavior towards the Indians.
As the royal letter of November 1583 to the Audiencia of Nueva Granada notes, (the natives) “are sent
exhausted to work which causes their death” (se ofrecen humildes al trabajo que se sigue su muerte).93
In May 1582, King Philip sent a cédula (royal command) to the Bishop of Antekera (today’s Oaxaca
City in Mexico) and noted that “the severe treatment of the encomenderos has resulted by now
in a loss of one-third of them [the natives] in some regions.” The cédula (royal command) also
mentioned that they are looked upon as slaves, often bought and sold, beaten, or starved, and that
“there are mothers who kill their children at birth, saying that they want to liberate them from the
horrible tasks they would be enforced to do [as they grew older].”94
As early as November 1533, the Colonial Council issued a document calling upon the colony’s
leadership to follow the principles of proper, sensitive, and humane treatment due to the Indians
para que multipliquen y no se vayan acabando como hasta aquí (“so that they multiply and don’t end up
as occurred until now”). Nevertheless, the self-same document noted that these instructions should
not necessarily be obeyed por el percepto (“as being strictly perceived”) or be executed (de ejecutar)
a la letra (“to the letter”). Due to the long distance from Spain, the letter went on, the governors’
conscience and prudence, as well as God, would have to be their guide.95 This letter is tantamount to
an official confession of royal powerlessness, an acknowledgement of the abovementioned “system
of adaptation,” or as Magnus Mörner put it, “non-compliance of the law as a legal institution.” The
culture of adaptation enabled the viceroys to endorse life-threatening actions prohibited by the
kings, such as certain forms of tributo (tribute) payment, personal services (forced labor demanded
by encomenderos (beneficiaries) in lieu of poll taxes, which were formally banned in 1549), child
labor, etc.,96 the fatal consequences of which were attested to in the reports of district officials and
local church leaders.97
Thus, the Spanish monarchs, apparently accepting the seemingly inevitable human toll of the
plagues, such as those that swept through Spain during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,98
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focused their attention on the worsening human factor operating parallel to the epidemics. They
had no real success, most likely as a result of the colonial paradox. Interestingly, certain areas such
as Ecuador–where no mines operated–experienced a different fate. In these regions, the natives
made a more rapid recovery from the disasters of the plagues and the tasks meted out by the
Spanish.99 These unique conditions, enabling recovery, apparently missing in most other parts of
Spanish America,100 emphasize my argument regarding the negative impact of the Crown’s policy
in Spanish America.
What Led to the Colonial Paradox?
Why was there such a disparity between the Crown’s intentions and the chaotic reality that
prevailed in the colonies? What were the reasons behind the permanent appearance of contradictory
positions in the ruling monarch’s protective laws and directives? I would like to suggest a number
of explanations.
Following the marriage of Isabella of Castille and Ferdinand of Aragón, Spain became
embroiled in internal wars over unification, conquests, and vested interests in North Africa, Sicily,
southern Italy, Venice, and Milan. Moreover, it was not only deeply entangled in a struggle against
the Protestants and the Turks, and repeated rebellions in the Low Countries, but it also had to
contend with threats from Muslims residing in Spanish territory (primarily Valencia and Granada).
In addition, Spain was also involved in major commercial and military campaigns against pirates,
and the English and Dutch fleets in the Atlantic Ocean.101
In most cases, the conquests in America and elsewhere were not funded by the monarchy, but
by officers and soldiers, who had received bank loans and funding from prosperous merchants,
entrepreneurs, and even clergymen in the colonies and Spain, in exchange for high interest rates.
Payment was made by means of war assets and via the encomiendas (grants), to which the Indians
were forced to relocate.102 Furthermore, exploratory and invasive expeditions, though funded
mainly by the Crown, were also sponsored by commercial and banking interests, primarily from
Genoa. The annual interest rate for these loans was ten percent, with heavy penalties for undue
delays in their repayment.103
The considerable challenges the Spanish monarchy was facing at home (unifying Spain and
consolidating Ferdinand II’s personal rule over all of Spain after the queen’s death in 1504, and the
rule of Charles I following Ferdinand II’s death in 1516) created a chronic deficit in the Spanish
treasury and an ongoing crisis over the repayment of accumulated debts. In 1574, Spain’s overall
debt was 80 million ducats, whereas annual revenues totaled only 5.6 to 6 million ducats (twothirds of it coming from America), and annual expenditures amounted to more than 9 million
ducats. Spain was on the brink of a serious debt repayment crisis.104
Additionally, for internal political reasons, Spanish colonization was based not on the emigration
of self-employed peasants and mine workers, but on relatively few immigrants (about 118,000 by
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1572),105 who came mainly from society’s middle and upper classes, and functioned as planters,
cattle breeders, traders, managers, mining and sweatshop entrepreneurs, and so forth. The basis
for obtaining wealth–labor–was therefore imposed on the Indians. Indeed, one of the important
proposals about forced labor was put forward by Pedro de Pravia, a Dominican theologian and
council advisor, during the Third Provisional Convention of the Mexican Church. He suggested
that henceforth only Spanish settlers committed to working the vast lands of America with their
own hands–helped solely by hired workers–would be dispatched from Spain, instead of cynical
manipulators, who were only interested in filling their own pockets at the expense of the natives.106
Pravia also proposed that settlers who already resided in America and sought agricultural lands
for cultivation would receive estates only if they did not subject Indians to forced labor. If the
settlements did not develop this way, he warned, the growing number of newcomers from Spain
and Creoles born in New Spain would lead to the final and total destruction of the indigenous
population, which was already in considerable decline.107 Needless to say, the proposal remained
only nominally in conference protocols.
Another reason for the colonial paradox was the mother country’s decision not to consider
any alternative to the extremely arrogant, exploitative, and monopolistic order it had adopted,108
which was based not only on a theoretical recognition of the indigenous peoples, but also on
the fundamental liberty and sovereignty of the natives throughout America. From 1539, three
propositions were presented to the Crown by well-esteemed public figures, who had witnessed
the disaster in the colonies and feared that if the perception of power in America did not change,
Spain would be condemned for generations.
These proposals spoke about a type of Spanish-Indian partnership, either economic (Vitoria’s
proposal in his De Indis lecture of 1539),109 or political (las Casas’s outline presented in his essay
De imperatoria seu [sive] regia potestate (The Imperial or Royal Power) of 1555 or 1556). A third
suggestion, made by the Third Provisional Convention of the Mexican Church, spoke about
retaining domination, but based only on free Spanish and Indian labor. Las Casas’s idea of a
Spanish protectorate for America was further developed by a group of theologians and friars from
the Salamanca School that had formed around Vitoria during his lifetime. One member of this
group was the highly respected theologian Juan de la Peña, who wrote two essays–in 1560 and
1563 respectively–on this issue.110 Another was the valiant Franciscan, Alonso de Maldonado de
Buendia, who worked among the Indians of Peru and Mexico in 1551-1561. Shocked by the terrible
conditions they endured, he sent a series of memorandums on the idea of a colonial protectorate
to King Philip and the Council of the Indies between 1561 and 1567.111 A third figure was the wellknown theologian Juan Roa Dávila, who wrote a thoughtful essay on this theme, De regnorum
iustitia (The Kingdom of Justice), which was published in 1591.112
The most straightforward proposal, which could have been seen as a first step to a more
radical political resettlement of Spanish rule in America, was the one deliberated by the Third
Provisional Convention of the Mexican Church. It was based on the well-planned integration of all
caste members (mastizos (mixed-race inhabitants, the progeny of Spaniards and Indians), mulattos
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(mixed-race inhabitants, the progeny of Spaniards and Blacks), and free blacks) and the Spanish
vagabonds (called españoles ociosos) into the colonial labor system, in addition to free Indian labor,
and aimed at replacing the compulsory labor system and making it superfluous.
The Crown, which had studied these ideas closely, adopted none of them. According to
Anthony Pagden, this was not surprising “since, as Vitoria himself observed, kings were, of
necessity, pragmatic beings compelled to ‘think from hand to mouth.’”113 As Pagden pointed out,
from 1520, the kings of Spain no longer felt it necessary to prove their legitimacy, and even went so
far as to assume the “self-appointed role of the guardian of universal Christendom.”114 In 1542, the
monarchy considered dismantling the encomienda (grant) system, which frustrated royal authority
in America, but it soon backed down as previously noted. With regard to the pressures to end the
repartimiento/mita system115 (allocation of forced Indian labor), and adopt an alternative, free labor
system, the Crown was pessimistic, as its labor laws indicate. These regulations assert that the
Indians are “naturally inclined to idleness,”116 despised work, even when it benefited them, and
did not take on a task unless forced to do so;117 however, the labor laws implicitly promised that if
one day the Indians would adopt the modern labor mentality, forced labor–hardly an ideal means
of attracting people to work in any event–would be rescinded.118
In fact, the real reason for the open-ended existence of the coercive system was that if colonial
employers had to give the Indians full pay for their labor, no surplus would be left for the royal
quinta (fifth).119 Thus, although the Crown considered recruiting caste members and Spanish ociosas
(vagabonds) for a kind of a “compulsory hired work system,” it was never implemented because
it was not economically feasible and would have been resisted. Thus Spain continued to maintain
its compulsory working regime, based on Indian recruits only, until the end of the colonial era
(with special emphasis on Peru).120 As Nicolas Robins correctly noted, this system was “rigorously
reinforced by recourse to the lash, pillory, prison, and taking family members as hostages for debts,
among other means.”121 Furthermore, as long as the enforced labor continued to exist, so did the
incentives for human trafficking, especially in “zones of conflict or Spanish expansion,” as Restall
correctly pointed out, chiefly in the mining centers, which always craved cheap manpower.122
Thus the colonial paradox was fueled by ongoing demands to increase the colonial surplus, the
prevention of “homesteader” immigration to America, the indefinite extension of the encomienda
(grant) system, and more, while ignoring the severe molestation of the natives in the Spanish mines,
sweatshops,123 fields, private homes, and communities.
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Was the Outcome of Spain’s Colonial Paradox a Case of Genocide?
As far as Raphaël Lemkin was concerned, Spanish colonialism was clearly genocidal. He came to
this conclusion in his twenty-one-page document, which examined Spanish conduct with respect
to all three categories of his 1944 definition of genocide–physical, cultural, and biological.124
Lemkin’s analysis helped him crystallize his views regarding the motives of those involved
in the voyages of discovery and conquest–explorers, officers, soldiers, settlers, and clergymen. He
assessed a wide range of factors: the human factor, including the occupying armies and their level
of morality; the Spanish protectors of the Indian population, mainly church leaders, fathers or
monks, such as Montesinos and las Casas (at the beginning of his career), who faced considerable
difficulties when attempting to convey their critical messages to the Council of the Indies and the
Crown, and convince them of the severity of the situation; the methods of genocide, especially
the encomiendas (grants)–ironically established by Isabella as an alternative to slavery and a way
to protect the Indians, slavery, personal servitude, mining and pearl diving, which resulted in so
many deaths; the settlers’ nearly sovereign status vis-à-vis the mother country; and other dominant
institutions in the colony, such as family, church, and community.
The seminal theoretical basis guiding Lemkin’s observations included, primarily, the
institutional infrastructure, motivations, objectives, procedures, and weaknesses that defined
the colonial structure, its enterprises, and practices. Though they did not all reflect high levels
of genocide per se, he maintained that they uniformly targeted people defined solely as “natives”
(not as a people with a specific culture); implicitly perceived them as evil and subhuman, while
condemning them for their iniquities, including cannibalism; and viewed them as unworthy
of treatment as true human beings. In short, Lemkin asserted, Spanish rhetoric portrayed the
indigenous population as being earmarked only for servitude, to satisfy the needs, desires, and
pretenses for wealth and prestige of those invested in the colonial endeavor.
Lemkin found the colonists guilty on all counts. They succeeded in deceiving the basically
decent and upstanding Spanish kings. With the help of courtiers, nobles, and even priests, they
prevented the monarchs from learning what was really happening in Spanish America, kept them
from reading reports sent by las Casas, and even prevented him and others like him from getting
fair hearings in Spain. Since many of the colonists, certainly the senior royal officials among them,
were slaveholders, “they could not be induced to enforce the royal orders against slavery and other
abuses.” Moreover, being desperately thirsty for gold, they endorsed and ordered brutal actions
against the Indians, “and sometimes even perpetrated massacres, as we have seen.”125
Yet, Lemkin’s analysis is inaccurate. The kings were fully aware of what was going on in the
colony and knew that their orders could not be fully implemented. las Casas had unrestricted access
to the kings; his complaints were stated fully and freely, and even formed the basis of protective
legislation and preventive measures. Moreover, the violation of the instructions concerning the
natives was not the fault of the settlers alone. They had to be rewarded for their part in the conquest
and allowed to extract as much wealth as they could in order to send the largest “fifth” possible
to the Crown. It was also important to keep them placated and satisfied, lest they find convincing
reasons to separate from Spain. In other words, the kings had to allow the settlers to employ the
indigenous people indefinitely.
Lemkin also failed to point out the main cause of death among the natives. Neither the
conquest, nor the related massacres or brutal oppression of subsequent rebellions brought about
the decimation of the indigenous population, but rather the unremitting forced labor. Although he
stressed the importance of this factor, he did not give it sufficient weight. Nonetheless, despite the
limitations of his historical knowledge and the inaccuracies of his condemning account, Lemkin
had the insight to ferret out the structural factors of Spanish colonialism and point out how their
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cumulative effect corresponded to the dimensions of genocide. It seems to me that this approach
can help provide a more accurate picture about the reasons for the Indian disaster in Spanish
America: the massive exploitation of the natives, the ideology that justified it, the suppression of
the criticism that decried it, the systematic disregard of the Crown’s orders that were aimed at
regulating it–as well as the doublespeak and significant loopholes they contained, and the free
hand given to the colonial authorities to adjust them at their discretion to meet the “manifested
demands of the moment.” Few guarantees remained after such adjustments were made, because,
as Lemkin argued, the officials making them had economic interests of their own, and “could not
be induced to enforce royal orders against slavery and other abuses.”126 This is the crux of the
colonial paradox, a situation that gave rise to an immanently irreconcilable contradiction between
economic and political needs, on the one hand, and people’s lives, on the other.
Can the absence of intention allow us to conclude that the mass destruction of the indigenous
people of Spanish America is not genocide, but at most, as Guenter Lewy argues, a “crime against
humanity” in keeping with Article 7 of The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, or a
“genocide in the second degree,” according to the classification developed by Ward Churchill?127
It seems to me that, as long as we look at the dynamics and historic background that generated
the colonial paradox from the standpoint of intention, we would have to come to this conclusion.
The intention of harming the natives, whether general, special, specific, contextual, or otherwise,128
did not exist in sixteenth-century Spanish America, certainly not in the prima facie authoritativeness
needed, according to Lewy,129 for a positive ruling on the crime of genocide in the International
Criminal Court (ICC), or, even a special tribunal set up for former Spanish America. Yet, if we look at
the colonial paradox’s effects on indigenous society through a lens other than “intent”–a politically
biased concept with a multitude of interpretative problems, as David Stannard asserts,130–we may
reach a different conclusion.
First, I would like to introduce the concept of “political authorization,” a prerequisite for
any systemic action, certainly one such as genocide, which is aimed at bringing about profound
physical, cultural, or psychological damage to a large group of people and is never a random,
limited, or isolated act, but rather a large-scale operation, generally the outcome of “a series of
state strategies,” as Marc Levene explains.131 Thus, only explicit political authorization–expressed
either openly or covertly–can give rise to operational plans, mechanisms, and justifications that
could enable the implementation of genocide. Such authorization did not exist in Spanish America.
Instead, I suspect, there was a different kind of authorization that operated in Spanish America and
enabled the settlers to harm the Indians, otherwise it would never have happened. I would like
to define it as “implicit authorization,” which was much more encrypted, obtrusive, and elusive,
though equally effective and destructive.
The Crown apparently took the road of implicit authorization because it became trapped in
America, and decided to follow an autocratic direction, rather than any of the proposed alternatives.
Although the mandate for Spanish America included protective directives, all the Spanish officials
and settlers there understood that they were “transparent laws, guidelines created for declarative
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purposes,”132 and that no one intended to “stop violators and reward those who strictly adhered to
them,” as Alonso de Maldonado wrote to King Felipe in 1565. The result was, Maldonado asserted,
an acknowledged compromise, which enabled a kind of indefinite indigenous slavery, a situation
that was (ha sido) causa de infinitas muertes (“a direct cause of endless deaths”) of the natives.133 It
appears to me that these anomalies, along with the license the Crown gave its agents to interpret
royal ordinances and laws, and the ban on publishing unauthorized criticism of colonial policy,
support the conclusion that Spanish America became a hothouse of implicit authorization to harm
the Indians. This chaotic state of affairs parallels the terms “omission” or “reckless disregard” used
in the discourse on genocide (albeit terms the UN repeatedly refused to add its basic definition
of genocide).134 To be sure, every institution, mission, business, settler, and inspector in Spanish
America knew about, witnessed, or took part in its fatal results.135
The existence of implicit authorization was discussed in the early 1970s–though not in exactly
the same terms–in the well-known dispute between Benjamin Keen and Lewis Hanke regarding
the Crown’s protective measures. Hanke tended to be favorably impressed by the institutional
measures taken to lessen the brutality in America.136 Keen, on the other hand, was unconvinced
by the declared intentions of both Crown and Church. In his opinion, the situation was not the
outcome of a discrepancy between legislation and reality. Rather, it stemmed from the contradiction
between the laws that served the Spanish, which were strictly applied, and the laws that presumably
protected the natives and limited Spanish freedom of action, which were not enforced.137
The paradox underlying the implicit authorization to harm native Americans was shaped
not only by the politics of authoritative colonial rule, but also by Spain’s conceptualization of
America as an asset that could be managed by bona fide officials living far away from the Crown’s
supervision, officials who would ensure that the asset remained eternally productive, intact, and
human. This outlook stemmed from the monarchy’s desperate need for revenues, clearly perceived
as a weakness by local groups in America, which gave them, as John Lynch pointed out, “the
leverage they wanted to make deals with bureaucrats instead of merely obeying them.”138 As a
result, Lynch asserted, “the colonial state remained intact, but only by diluting one of the essential
qualities of a state–the power to exact obedience.”139 “Spanish America came to be administered
by a system of bureaucratic compromise,” and decisions were made according to the “unwritten
constitution” of “informal consultation between the royal bureaucracy and the king’s colonial
subjects.”140
Under these circumstances, the Crown was unable to demand strict implementation of its
protective instructions, or consider other modes of operation in America, not without conducting
serious negotiations with royal officials and settlers, for fear of losing the entire enterprise to them.
This delicate existential equilibrium had already become clear in 1542,141 and perhaps as early
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as 1518, when Cortés sailed to Mexico on his big adventure without any royal authorization–a
traitorous but skillfully executed move. Cortés could easily have declared himself king of a
prosperous and self-contained domain of his own and become a model for future adventurers
(among them his own son, Martín Cortés).142 In view of this tenuous situation, the question of the
monarchy’s ability to fight for the Indian cause became almost irrelevant. This was especially true
as more and more Creole settlers were attaining public office. According to John Lynch, “while the
Americanization of the bureaucracy may have been a victory for the Creole elites, it was a further
setback for the ethnic communities and those who had to supply tribute, taxes, and labor, groups
who found themselves without allies under the new alignment.”143
Taken together, the heavy toll exacted from the natives in body, mind, spirit, and way of life
for the purpose of maintaining the vast Spanish enterprise of capital, power, and prestige, and the
unrelenting force used to preserve this equation–starting with seduction, and ending with violence
and brutality when resisted–verges, I believe, on the realm of genocide. The end result of this
process was the substantial decimation of the native population. Although the kings tried their best
to stop it, they were foiled by the colonial paradox in which they were caught. It was this weakness
that provided the fertile soil on which the implicit authorization to harm the Indians could flourish.
The Indians held no hope of physical salvation from the Church either. My research indicates
that the Church had, in all earnestness, intended to save the souls of the native population, but at a
very early stage of the colonial enterprise, it had been forced to relinquish the acculturation process
to the encomenderos (beneficiaries), who had very little interest in Christianity, while their main
focus was on cashing in their war debts, and increasing their wealth and status.144 Moreover, the
Popes immediately after bestowing the right to head the patronato (colonial Church patronage) on
the kings of Spain, actually lost their freedom of action. This helplessness extended to the American
Church as well, as clearly demonstrated in the letter dispatched to King Philip II by all the bishops
of New Spain.145 Written on October 16, 1585, at the end of the Third Provisional Convention of the
Mexican Church, it severely attacked the “principal ruina y disminución de los indios” (the outright
ruin and decline of the Indians), using the same phrase employed by the archbishop of Mexico,
Pedro Moya de Contreras when he harshly condemned the repartimiento (forced labor) system in
his January 1585 letter to King Philip.146 De Contreras’s correspondence explains why he and his
bishops were so determined to put an end to this painful and ruinous policy, even though they
were, regrettably, unable to do so.
We ought to have commanded it by public decree and charged the consciences of the
governors and audiencias [high courts]. We have not done so except by a general decree in
which we represented to them how important it is for them to look to the ill treatment and
harassment of these Indians, because the judgment of God awaits them. Their oppression
cries before the presence of God and demands vengeance of Him. But the jurisdiction of the
Church and the authority of the prelates is so oppressed and downtrodden in this realm,
on the pretext that it hinders profit and that little money will be made and that the proper
fidelity and vassalage of Your Majesty has been lacking, [that] it would do nothing but
provoke them to hatred and rage and incur the indignation of those who, stuffed with the
blood of these poor creatures, are carried forward only by their greed and their ambition to
leave America and return to Spain, bringing an end to its colonial enterprise. See Antonio Osuna Fernandez-Largo,
“Etica y Política en las Leyes de Indias del siglo XVI,” Anuario de Filosofia del Derecho 8, (1991), 96.
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be rich in violation of our faith and in harm to their neighbor. It would have achieved no
other effect than more harm and evil because of their hardened contumacy.147

Thus “one of the most violently agitated questions of the Third Mexican Council,”148 like many
other crucial matters regarding Spanish rule in America, was disregarded.
Conclusion
Raphaël Lemkin did not convince the academic community that genocide was inevitably linked
to colonialism. Studies have shown that not every case of colonialism has led to acts of genocide,
especially not the exploitive type of settler colonialism of Spanish America.149 Researchers could
not even find a correlation between the method of pseudo colonialism or annexation instituted
by the Nazis in certain regions of Poland, and the Jewish and Polish genocide that occurred
independently, that is, without any connection to the annexation of Polish lands.150 Nonetheless,
due to the offensive character of all settler colonialism, and the difficulty of analyzing these
cases without becoming entangled in the overuse of the term genocide, alternative designations
such as “indigenocide,”151 “ethnocide,”152 “genocidal moments,”153 or “relations of genocide”154
have emerged. In view of this conceptual overburdening, if not a kind of “definitional dilution,”
Lemkin’s approach has become even more isolated.
What’s more, Lemkin was apparently unable to convince academia regarding other issues,
e.g., that genocide encompasses more than the perpetration of physical harm to a specific group
of people targeted for annihilation, thus rendering the UN definition unsatisfactory. In his view,
genocide can emerge circumstantially, and not necessarily with the parent state’s authorization,
that is, as an outcome of unplanned and unpredictable developments in the conduct of the
colonial regime, while the parent state is pressured into approving what transpires, whether
reluctantly or wholeheartedly. Moreover, it is not necessarily episodic, but can occur over time,
even an extended period of time; it is not limited to the twentieth century, but has been committed
throughout human history, even when the concept as such was unknown; and, finally, colonial
situations could (and did) give rise to genocidal circumstances, although this did not happen
everywhere. As regards Spanish American history, Lemkin never doubted that what had occurred
there was in fact genocide. Thus, he did not even bother mentioning the epidemics, in contrast
to what researchers, many of whom did not share his views, designated as the pivotal cause for
the region’s demographic demise. In this sense, Lemkin, who no doubt knew enough about the
epidemics in Spanish America, seemingly concluded that they contributed less than the political
actions he investigated to the great loss of human lives; therefore, he preferred to discount them
in his analysis. las Casas took the same polemical stance in his Short Account.155 Ironically, but
147
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certainly in line with the colonial paradox, the Spanish kings agreed with this analysis, since the
various laws and decrees they promulgated made no mention of diseases.
The testimonies on which Lemkin relied led him to conclude that the “radical accumulation”156
of the causes of oppression, and the physical, psychological, and spiritual impairment of the
Indians–war, so-called “pacification,”157 robbery, enslavement, exploitation, invasions, feelings of
worthlessness, political delegitimization, systematic religious conversion, cultural annihilation,
uprooting and displacement–overwhelmed the Indians’ entire array of self-protective norms and
measures, and ultimately broke their spirits. Lemkin did not succumb to simplification or syllogism.
He did not avoid presenting the chaotic, tyrannical qualities of the Indian cultures, including the
horrors of human sacrifice and cannibalistic feasts, or the adaptation and rehabilitation processes
that they endured following their destruction.158 He was able to acknowledge these aspects of the
indigenous culture in spite of the destruction of the Indian population and most of its cultural
infrastructures, and to separate these two aspects, because, even in cases of genocide, collaboration,
adaptation, and recovery are quite common.
Lemkin grasped the enormous proportions of the human calamity that occurred in Spanish
America; however, his study was empirically and methodologically too brief to support the term
genocide, which he attributed to it. The present study expands Lemkin’s observations, and fills in
some of the gaps needed to support his claim, especially in regard to the overall human debacle in
America, and the colonial paradox, the method through which it was rationalized and entrenched.
Countless criticisms, testimonies, and reports from diverse corners of the colony, and the Crown’s
enraged response to the troubling information they contained provide powerful evidence for
this analysis. Hasty “legitimization ceremonies,”159 such as the Meeting at Burgos in 1512, the
Valladolid debate of 1550-1551, and in some respects even the New Laws of 1542, offer further
confirmation of this argument. This is not to mention the monarchy’s hasty cancellation of the
“protocol for conquest,”160 as Patricia Seed termed the Requerimiento (Requirement Document) war
cry,161 an appalling document that made the Indians potential enemies of Spain (and the Church),
and prisoners of a just war, unless they surrendered unconditionally to the whims of subjugation,
exploitation, Christianization, transfer, and so on.
This partial list of chiefly emotional steps–taken out of anger, panic, pain, or the desire to
mask reality–demonstrates different aspects of the exploitation-conservation paradox in Spanish
America, where these two contrasting tendencies could not be balanced. In the end, the first
overtook the second. Should the catastrophic results of this paradigmatic collapse be called
genocide? It seems to me that this is the best term available at the moment, because it has the
capacity to encompass the entire weight of the conquest, subjugation, humiliation, and exploitation
that befell the Indians, which led to their almost total extinction. It may be possible to define it as
genocide “by effect,”162 as Restall did; yet, as Adam Jones correctly points out, several destructive
steps taken by the Crown were nonetheless intentional.163 One case concerned the Caribes, and by
extension, other peripheral, troublesome groups that were difficult to pacify. The kings allowed
the enslavement of these people for an indefinite period of time. Yet, according to my findings,
the most destructive example was the preservation of the repartimiento/mita system until the end
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of Spanish rule in America. On top of these and other implicit or explicit policies discussed in this
essay, which deliberately or in effect authorized actions that endangered or shortened Indian lives,
we have the plagues. Perhaps not the plagues as such, but, following Suzanne Alchon’s and Andrés
Reséndez’s observation, the luck of having enough breathing space to recover from them.
In any event, the story of Spanish colonization in America ended sadly. American cultures
were fundamentally rendered extinct. Daily life, literature, writing, ceremonies and rituals, musical
compositions, the sacred pantheon of the gods, the cosmology, the family structure, the generic
community, patterns of economic production and political organization were nearly all wiped out
without a genuine prospect of restoration. What remained, or could be restored, is only a tiny
vestige of what had been. This, I suspect, was the reason for Juan Montalvo’s desperate grief.
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